<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/</id><title>iggyp0pi</title><subtitle>Security research by Igor "iggyp0pi" Stepansky: offensive security, AppSec, cloud &amp; Kubernetes, agentic AI.</subtitle> <updated>2026-11-04T23:47:11+02:00</updated> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> <uri>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/</uri> </author><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/feed.xml"/><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/"/> <generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="4.4.1">Jekyll</generator> <rights> © 2026 Igor Stepansky </rights> <icon>/assets/img/favicons/favicon.ico</icon> <logo>/assets/img/favicons/favicon-96x96.png</logo> <entry><title>Any Key Will Do: SSH Host Key Checks Off by Default in Apache Airflow</title><link href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/airflow-ssh-host-key-verification-cve-2026-94134/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Any Key Will Do: SSH Host Key Checks Off by Default in Apache Airflow" /><published>2026-10-16T10:00:00+03:00</published> <updated>2026-11-04T09:50:17+02:00</updated> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/airflow-ssh-host-key-verification-cve-2026-94134/</id> <content type="text/html" src="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/airflow-ssh-host-key-verification-cve-2026-94134/" /> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> </author> <category term="Vulnerability Research" /> <category term="AppSec" /> <summary>Apache Airflow's SSH and SFTP connections skipped host key verification by default, so a worker would accept any server that answered. That hands a machine-in-the-middle the credentials and data of every task. This is CVE-2026-94134 and CVE-2026-94135, and the only warning was a line in a log.</summary> </entry> <entry><title>Any User, Any URL: Webhook SSRF in Harbor</title><link href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/harbor-webhook-ssrf/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Any User, Any URL: Webhook SSRF in Harbor" /><published>2026-10-06T10:00:00+03:00</published> <updated>2026-11-04T09:50:17+02:00</updated> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/harbor-webhook-ssrf/</id> <content type="text/html" src="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/harbor-webhook-ssrf/" /> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> </author> <category term="Vulnerability Research" /> <category term="Container Security" /> <summary>Any registered Harbor user can create a project, and a project admin can point a webhook at any URL, including the cloud metadata endpoint. No validation, no admin needed. This is how a project webhook becomes a direct path to the registry's cloud IAM credentials.</summary> </entry> <entry><title>hello, world</title><link href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/hello-world/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="hello, world" /><published>2026-09-17T20:00:00+03:00</published> <updated>2026-11-03T17:43:37+02:00</updated> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/hello-world/</id> <content type="text/html" src="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/hello-world/" /> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> </author> <category term="Meta" /> <summary>Why this blog exists, and the two rules every post here follows.</summary> </entry> <entry><title>The Model Will Fetch Anything: SSRF in LMDeploy</title><link href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/lmdeploy-ssrf-cve-2026-33626/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The Model Will Fetch Anything: SSRF in LMDeploy" /><published>2026-04-21T10:00:00+03:00</published> <updated>2026-11-04T09:50:17+02:00</updated> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/lmdeploy-ssrf-cve-2026-33626/</id> <content type="text/html" src="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/lmdeploy-ssrf-cve-2026-33626/" /> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> </author> <category term="Vulnerability Research" /> <category term="AI Security" /> <summary>You give a vision model an image by URL and the server fetches it for you. LMDeploy fetched any URL at all, including the cloud metadata endpoint, with no authentication required. CVE-2026-33626 was hit in the wild about twelve hours after the advisory went public.</summary> </entry> <entry><title>When the Guard Makes the Call: SSRF in Kyverno</title><link href="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/kyverno-ssrf-cve-2026-4789/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="When the Guard Makes the Call: SSRF in Kyverno" /><published>2026-03-30T10:00:00+03:00</published> <updated>2026-11-04T10:15:12+02:00</updated> <id>https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/kyverno-ssrf-cve-2026-4789/</id> <content type="text/html" src="https://iggyp0pi.wtf/posts/kyverno-ssrf-cve-2026-4789/" /> <author> <name>Igor Stepansky</name> </author> <category term="Vulnerability Research" /> <category term="Kubernetes" /> <summary>Kyverno lets you write cluster policies that make HTTP calls. The call goes out from Kyverno's own pod, with Kyverno's network reach, not yours. CVE-2026-4789 turns a namespace-scoped policy into server-side request forgery against the whole cluster and the cloud metadata service. CVSS 9.8.</summary> </entry> </feed>
